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Stephen Kim Park* & Tim R Samples"
ABSTRACT
The global sovereign debt market, lacking a formal
bankruptcy regime or binding regulatory oversight, is
fundamentally shaped by the specter of conflicts between debtors
that refuse to pay and holdout creditors that refuse to settle.
Never was this more evident than in Argentina's most recent
sovereign debt crisis, which spurred daring, innovative, and
often controversial legal strategies. This Article focuses on one of
the legacies of Argentina's sovereign debt crisis: the use of
investor-state arbitration under international investment law to
enforce sovereign bond contracts. Following Argentina's
financial collapse in 2001, private creditors brought dozens of
cases against Argentina before the International Center for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Among these ICSID
cases was Abaclat and Others v. The Argentine Republic, which
marked the first time that an arbitral tribunal ruled that it had
jurisdiction to rule on a sovereign debt default and
restructuring under international investment law. With the
proliferation of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
mechanisms in bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and other
international investment agreements, this remedy will likely
grow in importance. In light of Abaclat and subsequent ICSID
cases, this Article analyzes Argentina's experience with
sovereign debt claims under BITs in the broader context of
sovereign debt disputes and ongoing measures undertaken by
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sovereigns in response to tribunalization. Looking forward, this
Article assesses the systemic implications of ISDS for the
exercise of sovereign authority in sovereign debt finance.
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1. INTRODUCTION
It is fair to say that the global sovereign debt market is governed
by what its participants think the law should be-rather than what it
actually is.1 The role of legal imagination-and constant re-
imagination-is stronger in sovereign debt finance than arguably any
other part of the global financial system. The absence of a formal
bankruptcy regime or binding regulatory oversight is fertile ground
for rogue behavior by opportunistic debtors and creditors alike.2
Nowhere has this been more evident than in Argentina's decades-long
dispute with holdout creditors following its historic default in 2001.
1. See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Responsible Sovereign Lending and
Borrowing, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 65 (2010) ("The law of sovereign debt is
therefore mostly about what the international community expects sovereign states to
do by way of honoring their financial commitments, and only marginally about the
rules that national courts apply when a sovereign debtor is sued under a commercial
debt instrument.").
2. See Stephen Kim Park & Tim R Samples, Towards Sovereign Equity, 21
STAN. J. L. Bus. & FiN. 240, 249-54 (2016) (examining rogue trends in sovereign debt).
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While Argentina's standoff with its holdout creditors appears to
finally be over,3 its reverberations will be felt for decades.
The search by creditors for the holy grail of enforceability has
spurred a range of novel legal strategies. Arguably one of the most
important consequences of Argentina's debt crisis is the use of
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) to adjudicate and enforce
sovereign debt obligations. In Abaclat and Others v. The Argentine
Republic, an arbitral tribunal at the International Center for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) determined that it had
the legal authority to hear mass claims by Italian bondholders
brought under Argentina's bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with
Italy.4 This landmark decision has been followed by two other ICSID
cases against Argentina.5
The use of ISDS in Argentina's debt disputes raises two
intertwined questions. First, what are appropriate fora for resolving
sovereign debt disputes? Sovereign debt is typically refinanced
through the exchange of original bonds for new bonds following ad
hoc negotiations between sovereign debtors and their creditors.6
Argentina's unilateral exchange offers in 2005 and 2010 involved
limited and narrow negotiations and the presentation of "take-it-or-
3. See Benedict Mander & Elaine Moore, Argentina Puts an End to Long
Holdouts Saga, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/516ab98a-08al-
11e6-876d-b823056b209b (last visited Aug. 27, 2017) (subscription required)
[https://perma.cc/6ARC-S6UF].
4. Abaclat v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Aug. 4, 2011), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/ita0236.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2017) [https://perma.cc/T2FB-
3BS2] (archived Aug. 27, 2017) [hereinafter Abaclat]. Abaclat only addressed
jurisdiction and refrained from determining the arbitration procedure pending the
merits phase of the proceedings. See Jessica Beess und Chrostin, Sovereign Debt
Restructuring and Mass Claims Arbitration before the ICSID, The Abaclat Case, 53
HARV. INT'L L. J. 505, 515 (2012). In 2016, Argentina reached a settlement agreement
with the Abaclat claimants before the issuance of an award. Caroline Simson,
Argentina Settles Historic ICSID Row With Italian Bondholders, LAW360 (Feb. 2, 2016,
7:35 PM), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/754309/argentina-settles-historic-icsid-row-
with-italian-bondholders (last visited Aug. 27, 2017) [https://perma.cc/7W4X-JVP9]
(archived Aug. 27, 2017).
5. Ambiente Ufficio S.P.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/08/9, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Feb. 8, 2013),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italawl276.pdf (last visited
Aug. 27, 2017) [https://perma.cc/8BR9-4BHG] (archived Aug. 27, 2017) [hereinafter
Ambiente Ufficio]; Giovanni Alemanni v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/8, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Nov. 17, 2014),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4O6l.pdf (last visited
Aug. 27, 2017) [https://perma.ccfL77F-LC9R] (archived Aug. 27, 2017) [hereinafter
Alemanni].
6. See Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora's Box: Sovereign Bonds in
International Arbitration, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 711, 712 (2007) (contrasting sovereign
debt restructurings to corporate reorganizations).
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leave-it" offers to creditors.7 Refusing to participate in these exchange
offers, holdout creditors filed hundreds of lawsuits in New York and
other jurisdictions, arguing that they were entitled to full
repayment.8 Given the likelihood of future cases before other ICSID
panels and other arbitral tribunals, how should the "tribunalization"
of sovereign debt finance be addressed in the event of overlap or
conflict with litigation in national courts?9 In the years following
Abaclat, legal scholars have started to grapple with the implications
of this source of pluralism in the global sovereign debt market. iO
Second, what interests should be taken into account in ISDS
cases involving a sovereign debtor? BITs and other international
investment agreements (IIAs) have dramatically grown in number
and importance in the past couple of decades." At their heart is the
private right of action granted to foreign investors to sue host
countries for violation of a treaty-based standard of protection.1 2 As
this Article shows, Abaclat and its progeny may be viewed as a
consequence of Argentina's extraordinary intransigence.1 3 However,
responses to rogue debtors, such as Argentina, often make bad law.14
Critics remain skeptical that ISDS is likely to rectify fundamental
problems in sovereign debt restructuring. In fact, prescriptions for
the widespread or standardized application of ISDS underestimate
7. See Anna Gelpern, What Bond Markets Can Learn From Argentina, INT'L
FIN. L. REV. 19, 19 (2005), http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/gelpern0405.pdf (last
visited Aug. 27, 2017) [https://perma.cc/Z7VG-9FG2] (archived Aug. 27, 2017)
(characterizing Argentina's restructuring negotiations as "unusually contentious").
8. Julian Schumacher, Sovereign Debt Litigation in Argentina: Implications of
the Pari Passu Default, 1 J. FIN. REG. 143, 144 (2015).
9. See Ruti Teitel & Robert Howse, Cross-Judging: Tribunalization in a
Fragmented but Interconnected Global Order Symposium- The Normalizing of
Adjudication In Complex International Governance Regimes: Patterns, Possibilities,
and Problems, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 959, 959 (2009) (defining tribunalization as
"the increase in the number of international courts and tribunals and the greater use of
such bodies to interpret and enforce international law, and to resolve disputes between
states and other actors in the international system").
10. See S.I. Strong, Rogue Debtors and Unanticipated Risk, 35 U. PA. J. INT'L L.
1139, 1142 (2014).
11. In addition to BITs, IIAs include investment chapters in free trade
agreements (FTAs), such as NAFTA, and other bilateral economic agreements. Jeswald
W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT'L L. J. 427,
428-29 (2010); see also Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International
Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 157, 176-77 (2005) (noting
the intermingling of trade and investment provisions in international economic
agreements).
12. Salacuse, supra note 11, at 459; see also Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing
International Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1607-10 (2011) (identifying ICSID arbitration
as an example of privatized international lawmaking).
13. See infra Part III.
14. See Anna Gelpern, Contract Hope and Sovereign Redemption, 8 CAP. MKTS.
L. J. 132, 133 (2013) (observing propensity of sovereign debt litigation to produce bad
law) [hereinafter Gelpern, Contract Hope].
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the systemic implications of sovereign debt restructuring.1 5 Rather
than fixing sovereign debt restructuring, the tribunalization of
sovereign debt disputes through ISDS undermines the need for
flexibility and the importance of politically palatable settlementS.16
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II describes the
convergence of international investment law and sovereign debt
finance. The Article explains how the unique challenges of enforcing
creditor claims against sovereign debtors and the proliferation of
ISDS mechanisms gave rise to this new remedy. Part III examines
Argentina's debt restructuring cases before ICSID as a case study.
Retrospectively, the Article analyzes Abaclat and its progeny in the
context of Argentina's experiences in litigation in national courts.
Prospectively, the Article identifies and addresses current and
possible future measures by Argentina in response to sovereign
bondholder arbitration. Part IV addresses the systemic implications
of ISDS for the exercise of sovereign authority in the context of
sovereign debt restructurings.
II. THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW TO
SOVEREIGN DEBT FINANCE
The use of ISDS is a product of iterative efforts by Argentina and
holdout creditors to exploit legal uncertainty and ambiguity in the
sovereign debt restructuring process. The following discussion
examines the legal and institutional basis for applying international
investment law to resolve sovereign debt disputes.
A. The Problem of Rogues and the Challenges of Enforcement in
Sovereign Debt
The global sovereign debt market differs from the commercial
debt market in several fundamental ways. There is no global court or
regulator to enforce debt commitments or monitor restructurings,1 7
and there is no bankruptcy law to determine priority of payment to
creditors.1 8 Due to a lack of enforcement mechanisms, sovereign
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See Lee C. Buchheit & Elena L. Daly, Minimizing Holdout Creditors, in
SOVEREIGN DEBT MANAGEMENT para. 1.43 (Rosa M. Lastry & Lee Buchheit eds., 2014)
(noting domestic political opposition to creditor-oriented inducements in
restructurings); see also Julian G. Ku, Don't Cry for Sovereign Debtors: Why Argentina's
Defeat in U.S. Courts Does Not Justify a Sovereign Debt Treaty, 36 U. PA. J. INT'L L.
433, 454 (2015) (noting the policy dislocations caused by bondholder litigation against
Argentina).
17. Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of
Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L. J. 1047, 1048 (2014).
18. Anna Gelpern, Building a Better Seating Chart for Sovereign
Restructurings, 53 EMORY L. J. 1115, 1120 (2004) [hereinafter Gelpern, Seating Chart].
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debtors have the discretion to default opportunistically.'9 However,
most sovereigns do in fact satisfy their debt obligations, sometimes
even under significant economic duress.20 To explain this compliance,
many scholars cite the threat of reputational sanctions, political
pressure, and internal collateral damage.2 '
Traditionally, sovereign insolvencies are resolved through
voluntary negotiated exchanges of existing debt obligations for new
debt obligations.22 Holdout creditors seeking full repayment have
chosen to sue sovereigns in foreign courts, typically in New York City
and London.23 Creditors have had little difficulty establishing
jurisdiction over sovereign debtors, either by negotiating waivers of
sovereign immunity in loan documents ex ante or through the
commercial activity exception to foreign sovereign immunity.2 4
However, creditors have limited recourse collecting judgments
against sovereigns that assert immunity against attachment of
assets25 or contract out of debt liability. 26
This ad hoc, decentralized restructuring process has deteriorated
dangerously in recent years.2 7 Negotiation between sovereigns and
their private creditors has drifted towards "1itigotiation"-an
unstable situation in which litigation and negotiation in different
courts against multiple sovereigns blurs with unpredictable results.2 8
19. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 17, at 1052-53.
20. See, e.g., Sebastian Boyd, Venezuela Refuses to Default. Few People Seem to
Understand Why, BLOOMBERG (July 4, 2016, 7:00 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-04/venezuela-refuses-to-default-few-
people-seem-to-understand-why (last visited Aug. 27, 2017) [https://perma.cclX7F6-
TTPG] (archived Aug. 27, 2017); Running Out of Time, ECONOMIST (Oct. 22, 2016),
http://www.economist.comlnews/finance-and-economics/21709042-devastating-spiral-
continues-running-out-time (last visited Aug. 27, 2017) [https://perma.cc/ETD6-ACX8]
(archived Aug. 27, 2017).
21. See Mitu Gulati & George Triantis, Contracts Without Law: Sovereign
Versus Corporate Debt, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 977, 987-88 (2007); Ugo Panizza, Federico
Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and
Default, 47 J. EcON. LITERATURE 651, 692 (2009).
22. Park & Samples, supra note 2, at 247.
23. See Gregory R. Day, Market Failure, Pari Passu, and the Law and
Economics Approach to the Sovereign Debt Crisis, 22 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 225, 232-
33 (2014) (noting foreign creditors' concern about prejudicial treatment in a sovereign's
domestic courts).
24. Karen Halverson Cross, The Extraterritorial Reach of Sovereign Debt
Enforcement, 12 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 111, 117 (2015) [hereinafter Cross,
Extraterritorial Reach].
25. See Day, supra note 23, at 235-39.
26. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 17, at 1086-87.
27. See Anna Gelpern, Sovereign Debt: Now What?, 41 YALE J. INVL L. ONLINE
45, 69- 85 (2016) (characterizing restructurings by Argentina, Greece, and Ukraine as
"shocks" that have highlighted weaknesses and spurred numerous reform initiatives)
[hereinafter Gelpern, Now What?].
28. See Joseph Cotterill, Sovereign Pari Passu and the Litigators of the Lost
Cause, 9 CAP. MKTs. L. J. 18, 21-23 (2014) (observing how holdout creditor litigation
against concerning the pari passu clause has become a broad-based, powerful
zo38 [VOL 50:1o33
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Fragmentation among creditors that have weak institutional
relationships with each other and divergent interests has enabled
rogue behavior by sovereign debtors and creditors.29 Reputational
considerations, creditor coordination mechanisms, and cross-
conditionality all have weakened as sources of order and authority in
the global sovereign debt market.30 Contentious, costly, and
inequitable restructurings-most notoriously, Argentina's-have
incited calls for legal reform.3 '
For the past couple of decades, reformers have fallen into two
camps: the public law institutionalists and the private law
contractualists.32  Among institutional reform advocates, the
International Monetary Fund's proposed Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) exemplified efforts to transplant
bankruptcy-like procedures into sovereign debt restructurings.3 3 In
contrast, contractual reform advocates point to the ability of
sovereign debt contracts to impose meaningful restraints on sovereign
behavior, in spite of the weakness of coercive external enforcement.3 4
First and foremost among the contractual innovations that have
taken root are collective action clauses (CACs), which permit a
majority or a supermajority of bondholders to change the payment
terms of an issue of bonds.3 5 Coupled with exit consents, which enable
a sovereign debtor to implement modifications to nonpayment terms
negotiating tool). But see Ku, supra note 16, at 452-53 (arguing that creditors will have
difficulty in asserting pari passu claims in future cases against other sovereigns).
29. See Park & Samples, supra note 2, at 249-52.
30. See Gelpern, Now What?, supra note 27, at 61-63.
31. See John A.E. Pottow, Mitigating the Problem of Vulture Holdout:
International Certification Boards for Sovereign-Debt Restructurings, 49 TEX. INT'L L.
J. 219, 224-27 (2014) (describing the costs of holdout creditors' tactics against
Argentina); see also Gelpern, Now What?, supra note 27, at 71-73 (underscoring
intercreditor equity problems in Argentina's debt settlement).
32. See Park & Samples, supra note 2, at 279 (discussing problems with both
approaches to addressing rogue trends in sovereign debt); see also Steven L. Schwarcz,
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options: An Analytical Comparison, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV.
95, 98-101 (2012) (describing the two potential alternatives to bailouts).
33. See ANNE 0. KRUEGER, IMF, A NEW APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN DEBT
RESTRUCTURING (2002), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/sdrmleng/sdrm.pdf
(last visited Aug. 27, 2017) [https://perma.cc/Q9CB-V7ZM] (archived Aug. 27, 2017); see
also Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Redesigning the International Lender of Last
Resort, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 177 (2005); Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to
Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 299, 300-01 (2005); Steven L. Schwarcz,
Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 956 (2000).
34. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Evolution of
Contractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 131, 133 (2012); see also
W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Contracting for State Intervention: The Origins of Sovereign
Debt Arbitration, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 335, 353-55 (2010) (characterizing dispute
settlement provisions in early twentieth century sovereign debt contracts as a means to
influence third party behavior).
35. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 17, at 1096-97. CACs increasingly include
aggregation clauses, which enable a sovereign debtor to amend payment terms across
multiple series of bonds. Choi et al., supra note 34, at 141.
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as a condition to participating in an exchange offer,36 CACs are a
powerful tool against holdout creditors. However, CACs are not a
panacea: among various shortcomings, many old sovereign bonds do
not include them, and they do not address coordination problems in
loans and other non-bond debt.3 7
B. Enforcing Sovereign Debt Obligations through Investor-State
Dispute Settlement
Amidst ongoing differences about the optimal manner to resolve
sovereign debt disputes, international investment law has emerged to
fill a perceived enforcement gap. There is no multilateral treaty
regime equivalent to the World Trade Organization (WTO) for
international trade or the Bretton Woods institutions.38 Rather,
international investment law consists of over three thousand
separate, independent, and freestanding IIAs.39 Despite their
number, IIAs arguably constitute a cohesive global regime for
international investment, with its own architecture and
decisionmaking processes.40
ISDS provisions in IIAs predominantly enable foreign investors
to opt to bring an investment-related claim to international
arbitration or to initiate a proceeding in a domestic court.41 IIAs
generally provide for investor-state arbitration under ICSID rules or,
alternatively, under ad hoc arbitration governed by the rules of the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL). 4 2 Investor-state arbitration empowers investors to
36. See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond
Exchanges, 48 UCLA L. REV. 59, 65-66 (2000).
37. Park & Samples, supra note 2, at 280.
38. Fr~ddric G. Sourgens, Keep the Faith: Investment Protection Following the
Denunciation of International Investment Agreements, 11 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 335,
342-44 (2013).
39. See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT,
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: A SEQUEL 18 (UNCTAD Series on Issues in
Int'l Inv. Agmts., 2013), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaeia2013d2-en.pdf
(last visited Aug. 28, 2017) [https://perma.cc/3MZV-M7GR] (archived Aug. 28, 2017).
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) maintains a
database of IIAs and model agreements. See International Investment Agreements
Navigator, UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA (last visited Aug. 28,
2017) [https://perma.cc/6ZKR-BLDG] (archived Aug. 28, 2017).
40. See Salacuse, supra note 11, at 463-68.
41. Joachim Pohl, Kekeletso Mashigo & Alexis Nohen, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
PROVISIONS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A LARGE SAMPLE SURVEY 11
(OECD Working Papers on Int'l Inv., 2012/02, 2012), https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/
investment-policyfWP-2012-2.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2017) [https://perma.cc/H3TD-
ZZ98] (archived Aug. 28, 2017) (noting that only 6.5% of sampled IIAs do not provide
for international arbitration).
42. Scott J. Shackelford, Eric L. Richards, Anjanette H. Raymond & Amanda
N. Craig, Using BITs to Protect Bytes: Promoting Cyber Peace by Safeguarding Trade
Secrets Through Bilateral Investment Treaties, 52 AM. BUS. L. J. 1, 26 (2015); see also
[VOL 50:7Io331040
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directly protect their economic interests through private rights of
action against host states.43 This fundamental characteristic lies at
the heart of its appeal to sovereign bondholders vis-A-vis litigation. In
theory, creditors qua investors can seek a judgment from an arbitral
tribunal that is not subject to substantive judicial review and
effectively constitutes a final judgment.44 Enforcement of awards
arising out of investor-state arbitration is relatively favorable to
creditors.4 5 Further, investor-state arbitration enables a large
number of bondholders to collectively pursue claims in a single mass
action arbitration.46
Sovereign debt contracts rarely provide for international
arbitration, instead stipulating national courts as the forum for
resolving disputes.4 7 Despite choice of forum provisions in sovereign
debt contracts that expressly submit to the jurisdiction of foreign
courts,48 investor-state arbitration elevates alleged breaches of a
bond contract to international treaty claims.49 Protection is provided
for a given investment, as defined by the IIA in force between home
country investors and a host country government.5 0 Therefore, a key
threshold issue is whether a sovereign's payment obligations on
outstanding bonds constitute a covered "investment" under the
applicable IIA. 51 Many HAs expressly include debt instruments as an
investment, and a broad definition of investment that does not
expressly exclude sovereign bonds (or similarly defined debt
instruments) qualifies.52
CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND
NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID
Convention]; G.A. Res. 31/98, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976).
43. Sourgens, supra note 38, at 355-56; see also Salacuse, supra note 11, at
462-63 (describing how investor-state arbitration relieves home country governments
of the obligation to advocate for their nationals through diplomatic channels).
44. Waibel, supra note 6, at 715; see also ICSID Convention, supra note 42, art.
54 (providing that ICSID member states must recognize and enforce ICSID awards as
if they were final judgments by their own respective domestic courts).
45. Cross, Sovereign Arbitration, in SOVEREIGN DEBT MANAGEMENT, supra
note 19, para. 12.05 [hereinafter Cross, Sovereign Arbitration].
46. See Ryan McCarl, ICSID Jurisdiction over International Mass Investment
Arbitrations: Due Process and Default Rules, 51 STAN. J INT'L L. 173, 174-75 (2015).
47. Weidemaier, supra note 34, at 335-36.
48. Waibel, supra note 6, at 734-36 (arguing that both exclusive and non-
exclusive submission to jurisdiction in a sovereign bond contract should be viewed as
on par with an investor-state settlement provision providing for arbitration in a BIT).
49. Id. at 717; see also Felipe Suescun de Roa, Investor-State Arbitration in
Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Role of Holdouts, 30 J. INT'L ARB. 131, 142 (2013)
(explaining the variance in national laws regarding execution of arbitration awards).
50. See Sourgens, supra note 38, at 354 (noting the lack of traditional privity
requirements for BITs).
51. Compare Beess und Chrostin, supra note 4, at 510-11 (describing the
Abaclat "double-barreled" test), with Waibel, supra note 6, at 729-32 (arguing against
an expansive definition of "investment" under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention).
52. See Suescun de Roa, supra note 49, at 144-45.
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HAs include numerous protections that provide potential
recourse to sovereign bondholders. Such clauses include a prohibition
against expropriation and discrimination in favor of home country
investors (national treatment) or third country investors (most
favored nation or MFN). 53 The transfers clause, which guarantees
that investments be transferable freely and without delay, may be
triggered by a sovereign bond default or during an ongoing
restructuring.54 The "umbrella" clause obligates states to respect
their international obligations to investors, notwithstanding any
conflicting contractual agreement between the parties.5 5 Finally,
most newer IAs include a "fair and equitable treatment" (FET)
clause, which provides broad-based procedural protections that could
arguably be triggered by the implementation of a sovereign debt
restructuring.56 However, the applicability of these protections to
sovereign debt contracts has not been addressed by an ICSID
tribunal. 5
The dramatic expansion of ISDS over the past decade has
provoked strong reactions from both states and private parties.5 8
Backlash has surfaced in domestic politics, treaty negotiations, and
trade strategies.5 9 An ISDS controversy nearly derailed the European
Union-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement.6 0
And concerns about ISDS were among several issues weighing on the
Trans-Pacific Partnership.6 ' ISDS concerns have also prompted some
53. See Waibel, supra note 6, at 739-47.
54. See generally Kevin P. Gallagher, Financial Crises and International
Investment Agreements: The Case of Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 3 GLOB. POL'Y. 362,
369-70 (2012) (analyzing how investment provisions in treaties may hinder the ability
of nations and private creditors to comprehensively negotiate sovereign debt
restructurings).
55. See Jos6 E. Alvarez, The Return of the State, 20 MINN. J. INT'L L. 223, 231-
32 (2011) (describing comprehensive umbrella clauses in U.S. Model BITs).
56. See generally Waibel, supra note 6, at 751-54 (examining whether
Argentina's initial bond exchange in 2005 could be viewed as a FET violation).
57. Cross, Sovereign Arbitration, supra note 45, ¶ 12.09.
58. See Sourgens, supra note 38, at 356 (noting the "academic and political
backlash" caused by the rapid growth in BIT claims). Even popular press outlets have
weighed in on ISDS. See, e.g., Secrets of a Global Super Court, BUZZFEED
https://www.buzzfeed.com/globalsupercourt (last visited June 2, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/HAH4-EW85] (archived Aug. 29, 2017) (linking to special reports
about ISDS).
59. See generally Alan Beattie, Arbitration on Trial: The US and UK's Fear of
the Supranational, FIN. TIMES (May 2, 2017), https://www.ft.com/contente607c6b2-
28f5-11e7-bc4b-5528796fe35c (subscription required) [https://permacc/AH8Y-YXSE]
(archived Aug. 29, 2017) (discussing political trends against supranational dispute
resolution).
60. See Jessica Murphy, Why the Canada-EU Trade Saga is Far From Over,
BBC NEWS (Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-37826855
[https://perma.cclV5BL-99UQ] (archived Aug. 29, 2017) (reporting on how ISDS became
a stumbling block for the completion of the free trade agreement).
61. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer, ISDS Controversy, TRADE & INV. POLY WATCH -
PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIcs (May 13, 2015, 10:00 AM),
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sovereigns-India in particular-to recalibrate their IIA strategies.62
The Article now turns to Argentina's experience and responses, a
flashpoint for ISDS and sovereign debt.
III. ARGENTINA'S DEBT RESTRUCTURING AND INVESTOR-STATE
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
In the past fifteen years, Argentina has played a leading role in
several key trends in sovereign debt, including: the employment of an
aggressive strategy to debt restructuring (with drastic haircuts),63 the
issuance of growth-linked securities as an incentive to creditors to
participate in restructurings,6 4 engagement in dramatic asset
skirmishes with creditors,6 5 and participation as co-protagonists in
NML v. Argentina, dubbed by the Financial Times as the "trial of the
century" in sovereign debt.66 Argentina's economic crisis in the early
2000s also triggered an unprecedented surge of investment
arbitration claims, including the landmark Abaclat case. The
following discussion provides context for those developments with an
emphasis on Argentina's experience with ISDS and its responses to
ISDS as a new forum for sovereign debt disputes.
A. Argentina's Historic Default and Debt Restructuring
Argentina's recent past in sovereign debt is singular and
exceptional, yet also emblematic. While exceptional across the board,
Argentina's ability to push the limits of sovereign power at the
margins of the law was enabled by governance gaps in the global
https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/isds-controversy
[https://perma.cclK3F6-P4HH] (archived Aug. 29, 2017) ("Thanks to the battle over the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), ISDS has now become a blogosphere term.").
62. See Kavaljit Singh, Letters to the Editor: ISDS is Unsuited to Meet Today's
Global Challenges, FIN. TIMES (May 7, 2017), https://www.ft.com/contented08cdOc-
2fea-11e7-9555-23ef563ecf9a (subscription required) [https://perma.cc/Y7TU-ENCC]
(archived Aug. 29, 2017) (describing India's recalibration of treaty practices in response
to ISDS concerns).
63. See infra Part III.A.
64. See Park & Samples, supra note 2, at 267-70 (discussing the terms and
structure of Argentina's GDP-linked warrants).
65. See Stephen Kim Park & Tim R Samples, Puerto Rico's Debt Dilemma and
Pathways Toward Sovereign Solvency, 54 AM. BUS. L. J. 9, 29-30 (2017) (noting
attempts by creditors to seize Argentine government assets overseas).
66. The NML litigation attracted a great deal of attention in the media and
academic literature. See generally W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Debt After NML
v. Argentina, 8 CAP. MKTS. L. J. 123 (2013) (discussing the historical context of NML
and potential consequences for sovereign debt markets); Joseph Cotterill, Argentine
Roulette, FIN. TIMES ALPHAVILLE, http://ftalphaville.ft.com/tag/pari-passu-sagal (last
visited June 2, 2017) [https://perma.cc/NC8Z-PKNN] (archived Aug. 29, 2017)
(discussing effects of reopening Argentina's debt restructuring).
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sovereign debt market.6 7 In fact, the conditions that led to
Argentina's historic standoff are endemic to sovereign debt.6 8
Likewise, in their aggressive and relentless pursuit of Argentina,
holdout creditors tested the sovereign debt system, establishing new
paths of conduct within those margins. The paucity of globally
enforceable legal rules enabled rogue behavior by Argentina, its
opportunistic creditors, and an exasperated court.69
At US$81.3 billion, Argentina's default in 2001 was as large as it
was complex, with over a half-million creditors holding 150 debt
instruments that were denominated in six currencies and subject to
the laws of eight countries.70 Negotiations with creditors were
unusually contentious and haircuts borne by creditors were harsh.7 '
Creditor participation in the restructuring was remarkably low:
holdout rates were about 23 percent after the 2005 exchange and 7
percent after the 2010 exchange.7 2 Argentina's debt crisis was also
extraordinary at the dispute phase in terms of volume, legal
strategies, and outcomes. Argentina accounted for nearly half of all
sovereign debt litigation worldwide between 1976 and 2010.73
Argentina also faced an unprecedented wave of investor-state
arbitration claims in the wake of the default. As shown in Table 1,
since the inception of ICSID, Argentina has been a respondent in
fifty-nine investment disputes, ranking number one by this
measure.74 Argentina's legal avalanche resulted from an unfortunate
67. See, e.g., Tim R Samples, Rogue Trends in Sovereign Debt: Argentina,
Vulture Funds, and Pari Passu Under New York Law, 35 NW. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 49, 63-
74 (2014) (documenting Argentina's debt crisis).
68. See Gelpern, Now What?, supra note 27, at 72-73.
69. See Pottow, supra note 31, at 227 ("Judges are nevertheless asked to make
important policy decisions in one-off interventions that occur every few years, a task to
which they are poorly suited. The litigiousness of vulture funds exacerbates this
problem."); W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Anna Gelpern, Injunctions in Sovereign Debt
Litigation, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 189, 211-12 (2014) (describing Argentina's record and
stated intent to defy court orders as a source of exasperation for the NML court).
70. See A Victory by Default?, ECONOMIST (Mar. 3, 2005),
http://www.economist.com/node/3715779 [https://perma.cc/N3PB-LHCB] (archived Aug.
29, 2017).
71. See Juan J. Cruces & Christoph Trebesch, Sovereign Defaults: The Price of
Haircuts, 5 AM. ECON. J.: MACROECONOMICS 85, 94-97 (2013) (finding that the average
haircut in sovereign restructurings is 37% and that the haircut in Argentina's 2005
exchange offer was over 75%).
72. See Juan J. Cruces & Tim R Samples, Settling Sovereign Debt's "Trial of the
Century", 31 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 5, 15-18 (2016) (illustrating bond-by-bond holdout
rates and analyzing the seven most litigated debt instruments in Argentina's default).
73. See Julian Schumacher et al., Sovereign Defaults in Court 11 (May 6, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.comlabstract=2189997 [https://perma.cc/9PJW-
NCTC] (archived Aug. 29, 2017) (noting that Argentina accounts for 41 creditor
lawsuits out of 108 during this period).
74. Many claims stemmed from emergency measures taken by the Argentine
government during the economic crisis. Most of the claims were filed at ICSID. See
Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.
[VOL 5o:1o33Io44
TRIBUNALIZING SOVEREIGN DEBT
perfect storm for investment disputes. During the 1990s, Argentina
aggressively liberalized its economy, undertaking large-scale
privatizations and embracing foreign investment.7 5 In parallel,
Argentina entered into nearly sixty BITs between 1990 and 2001.76
Together, these factors set the stage for Argentina's record-setting
investment dispute experience when the country plunged into a deep
economic crisis in the early 2000s.
unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByCountry (last visited June 2, 2017) [https://perma.ccl5Q7D-
BSR9] (archived Aug. 29, 2017),
75. See, e.g., Press Release, World Trade Organization, Argentina Realizes
Gains from Economic Reforms But Could Gain Even More from Multilateral
Liberalization (Jan. 13, 1998), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/tpr-e/tplO_-e.htm
[https://perma.ccNA4J-WSKA] (archived Aug. 29, 2017) (discussing growth in
Argentina's economy as a result of economic reforms and restructuring programs); see
also PAUL BLUSTEIN, AND THE MONEY KEPT ROLLING IN (AND OUT) 4 (2006) (noting
Argentina's policies of deregulation, privatization, anti-inflationary measures, and
trade liberalization).
76. Among Latin American countries, only Cuba has signed more BITs than
Argentina. However, only 40 of Cuba's 59 BITs are in force, compared to 52 Argentine
BITs that are in force. All the 56 total BITs signed by Argentina were signed between
1990 and 2001 except one (with Qatar in 2016). In addition, Argentina has another 16
trade agreements with investment provisions. See International Investment Agreements
Navigator, UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ IIA/CountryBits/8 (last
visited June 2, 2017) [https://perma.cc/BH88-XCZK (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
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Table 1. Investment Disp tes by Country7 7
Cases as Cases as Home



















Domestically, the 2001 economic crisis crushed Argentine living
standards.7 9 Even for a society that has endured a great deal of
77. Data on investment treaty disputes is incomplete. See generally Kevin P.
Gallagher & Elen Shrestha, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Developing Countries:
A Re-Appraisal (Global Development and Environmental Institute, Working Paper No.
11-01, 2011) (explaining problems inherent in investment arbitration datasets).
78. Perhaps not surprisingly, several of the sovereigns with a large number of
cases as a respondent state, relative to cases as the home state of the claimant, have
grown weary of ISDS. Argentina, Venezuela, Ecuador, and India, all of which have
high respondent home-state ratios, are among the most vocal and active countries in
the movement away from ISDS. See, e.g., Come and Get Me, ECONOMIST (Feb. 18,
2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21547836 [https://perma.cc/M6YU-JDCD]
(archived Aug. 29, 2017) (reporting on backlash against ICSID in South America);
Singh, supra note 62 (describing India's turn away from ISDS).
79. See Larry Rohter, Once Secure, Argentines Now Lack Food and Hope, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 2, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/02/world/once-secure-
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economic turbulence, this crisis was arguably la peor de todas, the
worst of all.80 Internally, the circumstances of Argentina's default set
the stage for a political backlash against international institutions
and foreign creditors.8 ' Holdout creditors-particularly the buitres or
"vulture" funds-became notorious in Argentine political culture,
spawning everything from protests to video games.8 2 Although to a
lesser extent than the widely despised vultures, ICSID disputes
became politically charged as well.8 3
Argentina's debt disputes dragged sovereign debt into uncharted
territory. Lacking enforcement powers over an unwilling sovereign
defendant, the NML court relied on a drastic remedy: broad
injunctions applicable to third parties.8 4 The broad scope of the NML
injunctions included many innocent third parties, such as exchange
bondholders and financial service providers.8 5 By targeting parties
more likely to comply with court orders than Argentina, these
injunctions succeeded in freezing Argentina's payments to exchange
bondholders, effectively imposing an international financial blockade
on Argentina.8 6 The NML injunctions even blocked an issuance of
argentines-now-lack-food-and-hope.html (subscription required) [https://perma.cc/
JPY5-TMXB] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
Over half of Argentina's population fell below the poverty line. See Leonardo
Gasparini, Poverty and Inequality in Argentina: Methodological Issues and a
Literature Review, CEDLAS-WORLD BANK 35 (Jan. 20, 2004),
http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/cedlas/monitoreo/pdfs/review-argentina.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7D8P-XBLX] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
80. See Jorge Oviedo, Crisis, la peor de todas, LA NACION (July 14, 2002),
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/413669-crisis-la-peor-de-todas [https://perma.cc/A6MM-
JQRP] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
81. See Samples, supra note 67, at 68-70 (connecting the "crisis of legitimacy"
of Argentina's external debt obligations with the government's response to creditor
claims).
82. See, e.g., Forget Angry Birds. This Video Game Targets Angry Investors,
BLOOMBERG (July 26, 2015, 7:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.cominews/articles/2015-
07-26/forget-angry-birds-this-video-game-takes-aim-at-angry-investors. (subscription
required) [https://perma.cc/C4ZN-QYST] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
83. See ECONOMIST, supra note 78 (reporting on ICSID controversies in
Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela).
84. The injunctions ordered Argentina to pay holdout creditors in full before
exchange bondholders could receive any payments and ultimately prompted a
secondary default in 2014. Order, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Argentina, No. 1:09-CV-01707
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2012).
85. See Cross, Extraterritorial Reach, supra note 24, at 136 (discussing the
extraterritorial dimensions of NML injunctions for third parties); Weidemaier &
Gelpern, supra note 69, at 213-17 (explaining NML injunctions and collateral costs for
third parties).
86. See Benedict Mander & Robin Wigglesworth, "Holdout" Slams Argentine
Debt Offer to End Financial Blockade, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/dl7fb6b4-dla3-11e5-986a-62c79fcbcead (subscription
required) [https://perma.cc/DB4W-DHSM] (archived Aug. 29, 2017) (reporting on
Argentina's request to have the injunctions lifted in light of efforts to settle with
holdout creditors).
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bonds by Argentina in Buenos Aires under Argentine law.87 As
Argentina's payments to exchange bondholders remained frozen, the
NML injunctions effectively prompted a secondary default by
Argentina-thirteen years after the original default in 2001.88
NML renewed doubts about the stability and viability of current
practices for sovereign debt restructuring.89 Ironically, for a case that
hinged on the pari passu or "equal treatment" clause, inequity among
creditors was dramatic.9 0 Further, NML raised doubts about creditor
incentives for participation in sovereign debt restructurings.9 1
B. The Abaclat Case and its Progeny
Argentina's debt disputes at ICSID have been groundbreaking
and controversial. Prior to the 2001 default, Argentine debt was held
by tens of thousands of bondholders in Italy, many of which were
individual retail investors.9 2 Following the default, the Italian
bondholders organized under the collective representation of the
Associazione per la Tutela Degli Investitori in Titoli Argentini (Task
87. See NML Capital v. Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978, 2015 WL 7087488
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2015).
88. See Benedict Mander, Cristina Ferndndez Holds Out for Victory in Debt
Battle, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/830ed4le-d475-11e4-
8be8-00144feab7de (subscription required) [https://perma.cc/K496-N8V5] (archived
Aug. 29, 2017) (reporting on the consequences of Argentina's defiance of U.S. court
rulings and resulting default in 2014).
89. See Gelpern, Now What?, supra note 27, at 69-73 (arguing that Argentina's
debt saga cast doubts about the sovereign debt restructuring regime); see also Staff
Report & Press Release from Yan Liu, et al., Strengthening the Contractual
Framework to Address Collective Action Problems in Sovereign Debt Restructuring 8-
15 (Sept. 2, 2014) https://www.imf.org/externallnp/pp/eng/2014/090214.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AF5M-NB2YJ (archived Aug. 29, 2017) (examining the implications of
NML).
90. See Gelpern, Seating Chart, supra note 18, at 1136 (describing pari passu
enforcement in courts as a "blunt, unpredictable, and generally inadequate weapon to
enforce intercreditor equity"); see also Charles Blitzer, Guest Post: Argentina's Debt
Offer-Don't Pop the Champagne Just Yet, FIN. TIMEs ALPHAVILLE (Feb. 12, 2016),
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2016/02/12/2153239/guest-post-argentinas-debt-offer-dont-
pop-the-champagne-just-yet/ (subscription required) [https://permaccH7XK-BL8B]
(archived Aug. 29, 2017) (describing dramatic differences in haircuts among creditors
in Argentina's initial settlement offer); Matt Levine, Argentina's Bond Fight Comes
Down to Its Worst Bonds, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 8, 2016),
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2016-02-08/argentina-s-bond-fight-comes-down-
to-its-worst-bonds [https://perma.cclA2EA-2BRE] (archived Aug. 29, 2017)
(highlighting dramatic disparities among creditors); Martin Guzman, An Analysis of
Argentina's 2001 Default Resolution (Ctr. for Int'l Governance Innovation, Paper No.
110, Oct. 2016), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/CIGI%20
Paper%20No.110WEB_-0.pdf [https://perma.cclBQ2A-BE8L] (archived Aug. 29, 2017)
(analyzing holdout incentives in light of intercreditor inequities).
91. See Guzman, supra note 90, at 2; Schumacher, supra note 8, at 146.
92. Abaclat, supra note 4, T 64.
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Force Argentina or TFA).93 In 2004, TFA then joined several other
creditor committees to negotiate with Argentina under the collective
representation of the Global Committee of Argentine Bondholders
(GCAB).9 4 In 2005, when Argentina launched the first of two
exchange offers, GCAB rejected the restructuring offer.9 5 The
following year, TFA filed a mass claim against Argentina at ICSID on
behalf of 180,000 Italian bondholders.9 6 The number of claimants
dropped to 60,000 after many of the Italian bondholders participated
in Argentina's second debt restructuring in 2010.97
In permitting bondholders to challenge the terms of a
restructuring before ICSID, Abaclat broke new ground in sovereign
debt. Several holdings are particularly crucial. First, the Abaclat
tribunal found that ICSID had jurisdiction to hear claims of the
entire group of sixty thousand bondholders.9 8 Lacking an established
ICSID framework for such claims, the Abaclat tribunal developed a
novel and controversial approach for "mass claims proceedings" that
enabled such large-scale claim arbitration.9 S.I. Strong has
characterized this use of ISDS as "regulatory arbitration"-that is, a
form of international lawmaking akin to a class action lawsuit.10 0
Similarly, Gus Van Harten and Martin Loughlin have described ISDS
as a "comprehensive form of global administrative law."'0 1
Similarly controversial was the finding that Argentina's
sovereign bonds should be considered an investment under the
93. TFA should not be confused with the America Task Force Argentina, a
lobbying entity funded by distressed debt hedge funds in the United States. Compare
Abaclat, IT 65-67 (explaining the origins and mandate of TFA), with lanthe Jeanne
Dugan, Argentine Lobby Mystifies "Members", WALL ST. J. (Oct. 15, 2012, 12:33 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444657804578050923796499176
(subscription required) [https://perma.cclLT68-P78F] (archived Aug. 29, 2017)
(reporting on the mysterious membership of America Task Force Argentina).
94. Press Release, Task Force Argentina, The Global Committee of Argentina
Bondholders Was Formally Established Today in Rome (Jan. 12, 2004),
http://www.tfargentina.it/download/GCAB-press-releasel20104.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A5AU-PZPW] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
95. The offer involved a deep haircut: 35 cents on the dollar plus a GDP-linked
warrant. See Cruces & Samples, supra note 72, at 28-30 (discussing investor eturns
on participation in Argentina's 2005 exchange).
96. Initially, the mass claim was registered as Giovanna A Beccara and others
v. The Argentine Republic before it was renamed as Abaclat et al. v. The Argentine
Republic. Abaclat, ¶ 641.
97. Abaclat, supra note 4, ¶ 216.
98. Id. T 551.
99. See id.
100. See S.I. Strong, Mass Procedures as a Form of 'Regulatory Arbitration" --
Abaclat v. Argentine Republic and the International Investment Regime, 38 J. CORP. L.
259, 263-65 (2013) (defining regulatory arbitration).
101. See Guz Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a
Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 121, 123 (2006) (arguing that
the "synergistic quality of the arrangement" between autonomous internationally
organized mechanisms and domestic systems, characterize the regime as global
administrative law).
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Argentina-Italy BIT and the ICSID Convention.10 2 Serious doubts
exist about whether sovereign debt should have been considered a
protected investment.103 Finally, the Abaclat tribunal found that the
default and restructuring may amount to a treaty claim-as opposed
to a pure contract claim, which would not trigger ICSID
jurisdiction.10 4 Although the claims involved the breach of a debt
contract, the tribunal found that the default stemmed from
Argentina's exercise of sovereign powers.1 05 Together, these holdings
provoke controversial questions about the relationship between public
international obligations (set forth in a treaty) and private
contractual obligations (set forth in the terms and conditions of
bonds).
Abaclat was followed by similar claims against Argentina. In two
separate cases, Ambiente Ufficio filed in 2013 and Alemanni filed in
2014, groups of Italian bondholders convinced ICSID tribunals to
accept multi-party claims. However, there were significant
differences in scale between Abaclat and the other Italian bondholder
cases. Both Ambiente Ufficio and Alemanni involved about one
hundred claimants each, a far cry from the tens of thousands in
Abaclat.1 06 Recognizing that asymmetry, the Ambiente Ufficio
tribunal distinguished their approach from the mass claims approach
of Abaclat.10 7 Likewise, the Alemanni tribunal distinguished its
decision from Abaclat on the question of volume and consolidation.10 8
To this day, Abaclat remains the only indisputably mass claims
decision in sovereign debt ISDS.1 09
The ISDS trend in sovereign debt enforcement that gained steam
with Abaclat has expanded beyond Argentina. In 2012, the Greek
102. See Abaclat, supra note 4, ¶¶ 356, 367 (concluding that Argentina's bonds
fit within the definition of an "investment" under the Argentina-Italy BIT as well as
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention).
103. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility (Oct. 28, 2011) (Georges Abi-Saab dissenting) ¶ 276 (concluding that the
tribunal lacks jurisdiction over sovereign debt instruments).
104. See Abaclat, supra note 4, ¶f 320-26 ("Consequently, the Tribunal
considers that the claims brought forward by Claimants in the present arbitration are
not pure contractual claims but treaty claims based on acts of a sovereign.").
105. Id. ¶¶ 323-26.
106. See, e.g., Ambiente Ufficio, supra note 5, ¶ 113 (describing how the number
of claimants dropped from 119 to 90 after Argentina's 2010 exchange offer).
107. See id., ¶ 120 ("[T]he dimension of the Claimants in the case to be decided
by the present Tribunal can in no way be compared to the Abaclat case, being merely
one thousandth of the latter.").
108. See Alemanni, supra note 5, ¶ 267 (asserting that the number of
claimants-somewhere between 74 and 183-does not fit the "mass" descriptor).
109. Though the terminology lacks precision and certainty, the Ambiente Ufficio
and Alemanni tribunals vigorously avoided characterizing their decisions on
jurisdiction and admissibility as "mass claims" or "class actions." See Ambiente Ufficio,
1 114 (declaring that the action should not be considered or referred to as a class action




debt restructuring became the largest sovereign restructuring in
history and the first by a Eurozone member state.1"0 In Poitovd v.
Greece, a Slovak bank holding Greek bonds brought ICSID claims
against Greece to challenge the restructuring."' In 2015, the Poitov
tribunal dismissed the claims, finding that sovereign bonds were not
investments under the Slovakia-Greece BIT.112 In distinguishing the
case from Abaclat and Ambiente Ufficio, the Pogtov6 tribunal noted
differences in the definition of investment in the applicable BITs." 3
The Slovakia-Greece BIT defines an investment as "shares in and
stock and debentures of a company and any other form of
participation in a company""4 whereas the Argentina-Italy BIT
contains a broader and quite vague definition of investment that
includes "obligations, private or public titles or any other right to
performances or services having economic value, including capitalized
revenues."1 15 These differences are especially notable in light of
recent responses to tribunalization.116
An ongoing case, Gramercy v. Peru, illustrates the latest trends
in the innovative use of ISDS in sovereign debt disputes. Peru issued
land bonds as compensation in a 1969 agrarian land reform but
stopped paying them in the 1980s and 1990s.11 7 Gramercy, a
distressed debt hedge fund, started buying the defaulted bonds in
2006.118 In 2016, Gramercy brought a US$1.6 billion claim against
Peru under UNCITRAL rules pursuant to the investment chapter of
the United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement of 2009.119 As
110. See Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch & Mitu Gulati, The Greek
Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy, at 24 (Peterson Inst. for Int'l Econ., Working Paper
No. 13-8, 2013), http://www.piie.com/publications/wp/wpl3-8.pdf [https://perma.cc/
K3F6-P4HH] (archived Aug. 26, 2017).
111. See PoitovA banka, a.s. and ISTROKAPITAL SE v. Hellenic Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8, Award of the Tribunal, ¶¶ 60-76 (Apr. 9, 2015) [hereinafter
Poitovi].
112. Id. ¶¶ 335, 379.
113. See id. TT 298-308.
114. Id. ¶ 333.
115. Abaclat, supra note 4, ¶ 352.
116. For example, the definition of investment in Argentina's most recent BIT
(with Qatar in 2016) is very similar to the Slovakia-Greece BIT. See infra notes 147-
150 and accompanying text.
117. See Karen Halverson Cross, Using Investment Arbitration to Enforce
Peruvian Agrarian Bonds, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Aug. 2, 2016),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/08/02/using-investment-arbitration-to-enforce-
peruvian-agrarian-bonds/ [https://perma.cclU86S-GNKD] (archived Aug. 26, 2017).
118. See Davide Scigliuzzo, Contentious Peru Bond Could Pay Off Handsomely
for Gramercy Fund, REUTERS (July 8, 2016, 12:43 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/peru-bonds-gramercy-idUSLIN19TOSK
[https://perma.cc/ZBQ3-FLR3] (archived Aug. 26, 2017) ("Gramercy bought over 9,700
land bonds from hundreds of individual bondholders between 2006 and 2008,
accumulating a share of around 20% of the total outstanding during that time.").
119. See Cross, supra note 117 (discussing strategic dimensions of filing under
UNCITRAL arbitration rules versus ICSID).
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the product of a strategic secondary market investment by an
experienced distressed sovereign debt investor, Gramercy represents
a potentially significant market development.120 The enforcement
innovations in Gramercy continue a broader trend in which distressed
debt hedge funds, which account for 90 percent of new cases, have
driven sovereign debt disputes.121
C. Argentina's Responses to Tribunalization
Argentina's debt disputes at ICSID ran concurrently with debt
litigation but proceeded in separate fora and were ultimately resolved
in separate settlement agreements.12 2 A timeline of Argentina's debt
disputes is illustrated in Annex 1. Following the 2005 exchange offer,
filings escalated sharply at ICSID and in court systems alike.123
While the NML litigation proceeded to a dramatic finale when
injunctions essentially froze Argentina's financial operations, the
Abaclat arbitral proceedings were suspended and then settled before
the award was finalized.124
Argentina's responses to the tribunalization of sovereign debt
disputes are still developing. In the early stages, ICSID claims
remained unpaid along with other plaintiff holdouts.12 5 But the two
fronts were distinct. First, the ICSID claims had not yet resulted in
final awards.126 Second, the Argentine government distinguished
between the Italian bondholders and the NML plaintiffs. The
extraordinarily bitter tone in Argentina's conflict with the so-called
vultures was not directed at the Abaclat claimants.'2 7 While the
120. See Ellen Kelleher, Hedge Fund Gentleman Wages Argentine War, FIN.
TIMES (Jan. 13, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/72ad46a4-5a4d-11e2-bc93-
00144feab49a (subscription required) [https://perma.cc/SMA9-FTCU] (archived Aug.
26, 2017) (profiling the managing partner and emerging market investment activities
of Gramercy Funds Management).
121. See Schumacher et al., supra note 73, at 7-12 (quantifying and outlining
the impact of vulture funds on sovereign debt litigation).
122. Some Italian bondholders also filed in New York to preserve contractual
claims, but those claims were stayed pending the results of ICSID arbitration. See
Brief for The Clearing House Association, L.L.C. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-
Appellees, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d. Cir. Jan. 4,
2013) (No. 12-105-cv(L)) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae Italian Holders].
123. See Schumacher, supra note 8, at 144 (illustrating the trajectory of
sovereign debt claims filed against Argentina from 2002 to 2014).
124. See Procedural Details of Abaclat and others v. Argentina Republic, ICSID,
(ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/
casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/07/5 (last visited June 2, 2017) [https://perma.cc/4PPV-
WJXY] (archived Aug. 26, 2017). (indicating that the proceedings were suspended on
March 21, 2016) [hereinafter Procedural Details].
125. See Brief of Amici Curiae Italian Holders, supra note 122, at 6-7
(describing Argentina's defiance of ICSID awards).
126. See Procedural Details, supra note 124.
127. See Bob Van Voris & Katia Porzecanski, Argentina Debt Injunction to Be
Lifted in Blow to Hedge Funds, BLOOMBERG MKTS. (Feb. 19, 2016),
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distressed debt hedge funds waged a bitter public relations campaign
against the presidential administration of Cristina Ferndndez de
Kirchner,128 the Italian bondholders were a particularly sympathetic
group of creditors.129 Many of the Italian bondholders were individual
retail investors with small holdings that were purchased before
Argentina defaulted.13 0 Finally, the Italian bondholders did not hold
the keys to the injunction that blocked Argentina's financial channels
and triggered the default in 2014.
Towards the end of the FernAndez de Kirchner administration,
important disputes-including Paris Club debts, Repsol claims for the
YPF nationalization, and various ICSID claims-were settled as
Argentina inched towards financial normalization.13 ' But disputes
with holdout creditors remained politically charged. A change in
government finally made a settlement with the holdouts possible.
Under the administration of Mauricio Macri, who took office in
December 2015, Argentina quickly launched an international
campaign to resolve the holdout problem and return to capital
markets.132 Before the end of January 2016, the Argentine
government had reached a settlement agreement with the TFA,
offering the Italian bondholders an amount equal to 150 percent of
https://www.bloomberg.cominews/articles/2016-02-19/argentina-bonds-judge-says-he-
will-lift-injunctions-on-debt-iku9ykz3 [https://perma.cc/8BPJ-MPAR] (archived Aug. 29,
2017) (reporting on Argentina's president Cristina Fernindez de Kirchner calling debt
holders "vultures" and Judge Thomas Griesa, the 85 year old jurist in the NML cases, a
"senile judge").
128. See, e.g., Nina Porzucki, Argentine President Cristina Ferndndez May Have
Dodged Criminal Charges, But the Conspiracy Theories Continue, PRI THE WORLD
(Apr, 23, 2015, 4:15 PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-04-23/argentine-president-
cristina-fern-ndez-may-have-dodged-criminal-charges [https:/perma.cc/VY8T-4EUT I
(archived Aug. 26, 2017) (referencing smear campaign waged by hedge funds against
FernAndez de Kirchner).
129. See Benedict Mander, Argentina to Pay Italian 'Holdout' Creditors, FIN.
TIMES (Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.ftcom/contentee587988-c9e2-1 le5-be0b-
b7ece4e953aO (subscription required) [https://perma.cc/SWF2-CG9UI (archived Aug.
29, 2017) ("TFA represents approximately 50,000 Italian retail investors, most of whom
are retired and hold on average $25,000-$50,000 in bonds each.").
130. Id.
131. See J.P. Rathbone, Ed Stocker & Vivianne Rodrigues, Argentina in Default
as Contest with Holdouts Enters Endgame, FIN. TIMES (June 29, 2014),
https://www.ft.com/content/15c4c27e-fded-11e3-acf8-00144feab7de (subscription
required) [https://perma.cc/BA6B-WFUC] (archived Aug. 29, 2017) (discussing
Argentina's settlements with Repsol and the Paris Club in 2014); Argentina settles five
investment treaty awards, ALLEN & OVERY (Nov. 7, 2013),
http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/Argentina-settles-five-investment-
treaty-awards.aspx [https://perma.cc/NW3Q-VLRZ] (archived Aug. 29, 2017)
(describing major ICSID settlements by Argentina in 2013).
132. See Alexandra Stevenson, How Argentina Settled a Billion-Dollar Debt
Dispute With Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES (April 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/04/25/business/dealbook/how-argentina-settled-a-billion-dollar-debt-dispute-with-
hedge-funds.html [https://perma.cc/3DY2-URUN] (archived Aug. 26, 2017) (discussing
how even before being sworn in as Argentina's finance secretary, Luis Caputo, under
instruction from Mauricio Macri, met with hedge fund leaders 'leading to a momentous
debt deal that has now allowed Argentina to rejoin the global finance markets").
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the original principal amount of their bonds, plus an allowance for
certain legal and administrative expenses.133 About a month later,
Argentina settled with the NML plaintiffs.134
Under Macri, Argentina has eagerly re-entered the global
sovereign debt market, from which it had been effectively shut out
during the NML and ICSID disputes. With a record-breaking USD
16.5 billion issuance in 2016, just months after the holdout
settlements, Argentina returned to global debt markets in dramatic
fashion.3 5  Remarkably, the offering was four times
oversubscribed.136
Considering the exceptional trauma of Argentina's sovereign
debt disputes, its official response to tribunalization has been
relatively tempered. As described below, Argentina's responses have
been limited to minor modifications within existing frameworks.
Arguably, this reflects the lack of exigency on the part of Argentina
following the settlement of the ICSID claims and the country's re-
entry in the global sovereign debt market. However, tribunalization
now poses legal risks to Argentina and other sovereign debtors. Going
forward, Argentina has several options to respond to tribunalization,
which range from relatively simple and ad hoc to legally dramatic
and politically fraught.
First and foremost among these options is modifying the terms of
its bond contracts. Argentina could amend the terms of new bonds to
explicitly exclude arbitration or Abaclat-style mass claim
arbitration.3 7 Consumer contracts in the United States often waive
rights to jury trials, class actions, and mass claim arbitration.'3 8 But
the ability to avoid arbitration with forum selection clauses in
sovereign debt contracts is somewhat uncertain. Argentina, for
133. The allowance for legal and administrative expenses amounted to
approximated 5-6% of the total value amount of the bonds tendered in the settlement
agreement. Accordingly, the settlement amounted to roughly 155% of the principal
amount of the defaulted bonds. See Agreement in Principle, Republic of Argentina and
Associazione per la Tutela degli Investitori in Titoli Argentini (Jan. 31, 2016) (on file
with authors).
134. See generally Cruces & Samples, supra note 72 (analyzing various aspects
of the settlement).
135. See Julie Wernau & Carolyn Cui, Argentina Returns to Global Debt
Markets With $16.5 Billion Bond Sale, WALL ST. J. (April 19, 2016, 9:05 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/argentina-returns-to-global-debt-markets-with-16-5-
billion-bond-sale-1461078033 [https://perma.cc/QHK2-VRXH] (archived Aug. 26, 2017).
136. See Hugh Bronstein & Sarah Marsh, Argentina Returns to Global Debt
Markets After 15-years, REUTERS (Apr. 19, 2016, 6:49 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-argentina-bonds-bids-idUSKCNOXG2WO
[https://perma.cc/KJY4-BJ4Q] (archived Aug. 26, 2017).
137. See Choi et al., supra note 34, at 140 (noting how sovereign bond contracts
can specify choice of forum clauses).
138. Such practices are controversial but has been reaffirmed by the Supreme
Court. See, e.g., DirectTV Inc. v. Imburgia 136 S. Ct. 463, 478 (2015) (holding that
arbitration clause was invalid only if "law of your state").
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instance, argued that bond contracts with forum selection clauses
designating federal courts in New York precluded ICSID arbitration
for contract claims.'3 9 But the Abaclat tribunal ruled the forum
selection clause in Argentina's bonds irrelevant for determining
ICSID jurisdiction.140 Argentina's 2016 bonds included a forum
selection clause with Argentina's submission to jurisdiction in any
New York state court or US federal court sitting in Manhattan, as in
previous issuances.141 But, perhaps in response to Abaclat, the 2016
issuance saw the notable addition of "exclusive" to the clause.142
Second, Argentina may seek to proactively carve out sovereign
debt in new future treaties, either by expressly excluding it from the
definition of investment or adding provisions that subject it to special
treatment.14 3 For example, annexes to ISDS provisions in the United
States-Uruguay BIT and US free trade agreements with Peru and
Colombia prohibit ISDS claims on the basis of a "negotiated debt
restructuring" in which a certain majority of bondholders have
consented to a change in payment terms.144 As part of a broad and
extensive ISDS recalibration, India revised its model BIT to exclude
sovereign debt.145
Generally speaking, Argentina's BITs provide for ICSID
arbitration and contain relatively broad definitions of investment.146
But all of Argentina's BITs-minus one-were entered into between
1990 and 2001.147 Notably, Argentina's only BIT since Abaclat
139. Abaclat, supra note 4, T 379.
140. The Abaclat tribunal ruled that the bondholder claims were treaty claims,
not contract claims. Id. IT 498-99 ("[T]he presence of forum selection clauses in the
contractual bond documents is irrelevant for the assessment of the existence and/or
validity of Argentina's consent to ICSID arbitration.").
141. See, e.g., Prospectus 12, Republic of Argentina, June 24, 1999 (on file with
authors); Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus Dated Dec. 27, 2004, Republic of
Argentina (Jan. 10, 2005), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/datal
914021/000095012305000302/y04567e424b5.htm [https://perma.cc/XV44-YCCNI
(archived Aug. 29, 2017) [hereinafter Prospectus Supplement].




143. Cross, Sovereign Arbitration, supra note 45, ¶ 12.45.
144. These provisions, in effect, prevent holdout creditors from initiating ICSID
arbitration when CACs have been triggered during a restructuring. See Gallagher,
supra note 54, at 370-72.
145. See Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty § 1.7, Republic
of India, https://www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/masterimage/Model%20Text%20for%
20the%20Indian%2OBilateral%20Investment%2OTreaty.pdf [https://perma.cclP4UN-
C4QX] (archived Aug. 29, 2017) (clarifying that investments do not include "any
interest in debt securities issued by a government or government-owned or controlled
enterprise, or loans to a government or government owned or controlled enterprise").
146. See, e.g., note 115 and accompanying text.
147. International Investment Agreements Navigator, UNCTAD,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/8 (last visited June 2, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/44E8-AZXQ] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
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contains a potentially significant revision to the definition of
investment. Signed in 2016 with Qatar, this BIT departs from the old
model used for the Argentina-Italy BIT and others.148 The Argentina-
Qatar BIT narrows the scope of investments significantly, providing
that financial instruments include only "[s]hares in stocks,
debentures or [sic] a company or any other similar forms of
participation in a company."149 This definition likely would be
interpreted to exclude sovereign debt.15 0
Third, as a similar but retroactive strategy, Argentina could
attempt to renegotiate its current BITs. As part of renegotiation or
withdrawal strategies, sovereigns may allow investment treaties to
expire or even to selectively terminate them.151 Such strategies have
become more common as countries respond to ISDS risks. Although
much of the backlash against ISDS has been led by left-leaning
governments in Latin America, others have joined the fray as well.152
In 2011, for instance, Australia issued a policy against ISDS in
bilateral and regional trade agreements.1 5 3 The Australia-United
States Free Trade Agreement expressly excludes ISDS.15 4 India's
broad shift away from ISDS-including the termination of existing
BITs-stands out as particularly far-reaching and significant.155 To
148. See The Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments between the
Argentina Republic and the State of Qatar, Arg.-Qatar, art. 1, June 11, 2016,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/5383 [https://perma.cc/
ZHZ7-R73J] (archived Aug. 29, 2017) (using a stricter definition of investments).
149. Id. at art. 2(b).
150. The Pogtovd tribunal considered that nearly identical language in the
Slovakia-Greece BIT excluded sovereign debt. See Poitovd, supra note 111, 1 340
("Again, the specific use of the term "debentures" only for debt issued by companies [...]
together with the lack of reference to any sort of public indebtedness, leads the
Tribunal to consider that the Parties to the treaty did not intend to treat government
securities, such as the GGBs, as investments for purposes of the BIT.").
151. See Leon E. Trakman & David Musayelyan, The Repudiation of Investor-
State Arbitration and Subsequent Treaty Practice: The Resurgence of Qualified
Investor-State Arbitration, 31 ICSID REV. 194, 199-203 (2015) (discussing Indonesia's
announcement of plans to allow BITs to expire in order to renegotiate them under a
revised model investment treaty with modified investor-state arbitration provisions as
well as selective termination of BITs by Bolivia and South Africa); Diane Marie Wick,
The Counter-Productivity of ICSID Denunciation and Proposals for Change, 11 J. INT'L
BUS. & L. 239, 288-90 (2012) (evaluating the pros and cons of denouncing or amending
BITs).
152. See Kyla Tienhaara & Patricia Ranald, Australia's Rejection of Investor-
State Dispute Settlement: Four Potential Contributing Factors, INV. TREATY NEWS (July
12, 2011), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2011/07/12/australias-rejection-of-investor-state-
dispute-settlement-four-potential-contributing-factors/ [https://perma.cclB4LC-A66C]
(archived Aug. 29, 2017) (analyzing Australia's movement away from ISDS).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Kavaljit Singh & Burghard Ilge, India Overhauls Its Investment Treaty
Regime, FIN. TIMES (July 15, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/53bd355c-8203-34af-
9c27-7bf990a447dc (subscription required) [https://perma.cclDP6P-SB27] (archived




date, Argentina has yet to engage in retroactive strategies to
renegotiate or terminate treaties with ISDS provisions.
As a related strategy, Argentina can invoke necessity arguments
to defend, excuse, or exempt investments from protections under a
given BIT.156 Most notably, non-precluded measures (NPM)
provisions permit host governments to take actions otherwise
inconsistent with the BIT to preserve essential security, public order,
or public health, or in other exceptional circumstances.'5 7 Argentina
can consider negotiating the inclusion of NPM clauses that expressly
cover responses to economic crises, such as Argentina's restructuring
of its external debt.s58 Again, India's most recent model BIT
expanded sovereign rights with significant revisions to controversial
investor rights, such as national treatment and fair and equitable
treatment.15 9
Fourth, Argentina could implement domestic laws to preclude,
impede, or delay ICSID arbitration. An ISDS provision may require
that that an investor-state claim be filed in a domestic court before
commencing international arbitration.160 Domestic laws may affect
the ability of foreign investors to execute an ICSID award against
state-owned assets.161 Controversy over this crucial procedural
question surfaced in Argentina's ISDS disputes following the 2001
economic crisis. For several years, Argentina insisted that award
creditors had to initiate proceedings in Argentine courts to enforce
156. See Andrew D. Mitchell & Caroline Henckel, Variations on a Theme:
Comparing the Concept of "Necessity" in International Investment Law and WTO Law,
14 CHI. J. INT'L L. 93, 108-09 (2013); see also Alan 0. Sykes, Economic "Necessity" in
International Law, 109 AM. J. INT'L L. 296 (2015) (outlining necessity arguments that
may be made under treaty obligations or customary international law).
157. For example, the NPM provision in Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT
provides: "This treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures
necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with
respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the
Protection of its essential security interests." Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal
Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Arg., art. XI, Nov. 14, 1991, 31
I.L.M. 124 (1991).
158. See William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection
in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-precluded Measures
Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 307, 408 (2008).
159. See Prabhash Ranjan & Pushkar Anand, The 2016 Indian Model Bilateral
Investment Treaty: A Critical Deconstruction, 38 NW. J. INT'L L. & BuS. (forthcoming
2018), https://ssrn.comlabstract=2946041 [https://perma.cc/83K5-HXMF] (archived
Aug. 28, 2017) (analyzing investor protections and sovereign authority in India's most
recent model BIT).
160. This local litigation requirement was at issue in a recent U.S. Supreme
Court case concerning the U.K. -Argentina BIT. See BG Group PLC v. Republic of Arg.,
134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014) (holding that arbitrators, not courts, have the primary authority
to determine arbitrability).
161. See Suescun de Roa, supra note 49, at 139-41 (describing several cases in
which investors encountered difficulties in executing ICSID awards in national courts).
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ICSID awards.162 That policy stood in tension with Argentina's
obligations under the ICSID Convention and, until recently, few
ICSID award creditors decided to pursue claims in Argentine
courts.163 Ultimately, Argentina began settling with ICSID award
creditors.164 Argentine courts ruled on the enforcement of ICSID
awards for the first time in 2016-however, uncertainty regarding
enforceability still persists.1 6 5
Finally, the most drastic response to tribunalization is to
withdraw from ICSID. Such backlash is not unheard of, especially in
Latin America. Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela withdrew from the
ICSID Convention amid controversy that investor interests were
unduly favored.166 In 2013, Argentina raised the possibility of
withdrawing from ICSID, but ultimately did not submit a notice of
withdrawal.1 6 7
IV. SYSTEMIC IMPLICATIONS OF TRIBUNALIZATION FOR
SOVEREIGN DEBT FINANCE
Argentina's extended debt crisis exposed major flaws in the "non-
system" for sovereign debt restructuring and dispute resolution.16 8
Notwithstanding the calm waters that Argentina currently treads in
the global sovereign debt market, the long term implications of
Argentina's prolonged debt saga are still coming into focuS.16 9 While
162. See ALLEN & OVERY, supra note 131 ("Argentina refused to voluntarily pay
the amounts due in respect of the awards, insisting that the successful claimants would




165. Leandro Javier Caputo & Ignacio J. Minorini Lima, First Argentine Court
Judgment on the Recognition of an ICSID Award, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Mar. 15, 2016),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/03/15/first-argentine-court-judgment-on-the-
recognition-of-an-icsid-award/ [https://perma.ccD4ZS-833A] (archived Aug. 29, 2017)
(analyzing recent developments in Argentine case law on the enforcement of ICSID
awards).
166. ECONOMIST, supra note 78 ("Argentina sees ICSID as too business-friendly,
with some justification.").
167. See William B. McElhiney, III, Responding to the Threat of Withdrawal: On
the Importance of Emphasizing the Interests of States, Investors, and the Transnational
Investment System in Bringing Resolution to Questions Surrounding the Future of
Investments with States Denouncing the ICSID Convention, 49 TEX. INT'L L. J. 601, 602
(2014).
168. See Anna Gelpern, Hard, Soft, and Embedded: Implementing Principles on
Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing, in SOVEREIGN FINANCING
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE UNCTAD PRINCIPLES ON RESPONSIBLE SOVEREIGN
LENDING AND BORROWING 357 (Carlos Esp6sito, Yuefen Li & Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky
eds., 2013) (referring to the ad hoc system for sovereign debt restructuring as a "non-
system").
169. See, e.g., INT'L MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING-
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUND'S LEGAL AND POLICY
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certain issues are unique to Argentina, others are indicative of
broader deficiencies that plague sovereign debt.1 70 Problems
emerging from Argentina's extraordinary debt crisis are symptomatic
of an inherently imperfect system that fails to comprehensively
resolve sovereign debt crises and equitably enforce creditor rights.
As this Article shows, Abaclat and its progeny may be viewed as
a logical means to resolve a uniquely protracted and costly
restructuring.1 7 1 Without a doubt, Abaclat and its progeny represent
an innovative new wrinkle in sovereign debt enforcement.'7 2 At first
glance, tribunalization has appeal as a new mode for managing the
relationship between sovereign debtors and their private creditors.
Its proponents argue that ISDS offers a powerful tool to hold rogue
debtors such as Argentina to account, thereby deterring prolonged
standoffs with holdout creditors and decreasing the likelihood of
failed restructurings.17 3
ISDS-at least in its current form-is not a silver bullet. In fact,
ISDS may even exacerbate existing weaknesses in the sovereign debt
system. First, ISDS does not dramatically enhance creditor rights.
While the mass claim aggregation seen in Abaclat simplified the
procedure for large numbers of Italian bondholders, it does not
represent a drastic improvement over existing mechanisms such as
class actions.174 Nor does ISDS resolve the challenge of enforcing
awards against a recalcitrant sovereign. While ICSID theoretically
FRAMEWORK 31 (2013), http://www.imf.org/externallnp/pp/eng/2013/042613.pdf
(expressing concerns about systemic problems that emerged in Argentina's debt saga);
Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Restructuring Sovereign Debt After NML v.
Argentina (Jan. 28, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://scholarship.law.duke.edul
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6342&context=faculty-scholarship [https://perma.cc/QKJ3-
7PBH] (archived Aug. 29, 2017) (noting observations for sovereign debt restructuring
that emerged from Argentina's debt litigation).
170. Other sovereign debt crises have exhibited similar problems with
intercreditor inequity, holdout complications, "too little, too late" restructurings, "bad
law" precedents, etc. See Park & Samples, supra note 2, at 249-54 (observing that
rogue trends in sovereign debt have exacerbated an already deeply imperfect system).
171. See Arturo C. Porzecanski, The Origins of Argentina's Litigation and
Arbitration Saga, 2002-2016, 40 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 41, 76 (2016) (concluding that the
origins of Argentina's extraordinary sovereign debt disputes are rooted in rogue
behavior, particularly between 2002 and 2005).
172. This innovation in enforcement strategies has continued with Gramercy's
strategic investment and ISDS complaint against Peru. See supra notes 117-121 and
accompanying text.
173. See Strong, supra note 10, at 1142 ("If investment arbitration is accepted as
a regulatory mechanism similar to regulatory litigation, then investors may have found
a workable solution to the problem of sovereign default.") (citations omitted); see also
Porzecanski, supra note 171, at 77 (identifying "major judicial and arbitral precedents"
as benefits of Argentina's sovereign debt saga).
174. Class actions have been widely used to aggregate claims in sovereign debt
disputes, including litigation against Argentina. See, e.g., Prospectus Supplement,
supra note 141, at 27 (discussing sovereign debt litigation, including numerous class
actions, filed against Argentina between 2002 and 2005).
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offers a solution to enforceability,175 the unique nature of sovereign
debt suggests that enthusiasm should be curbed.176 Nor did ISDS
fundamentally change the game for Argentina's other non-ISDS
award creditors.1 77 Like any other creditor, the Italian bondholders
had opportunities to participate in the 2005 and 2010 exchanges.
And, just like Argentina's other holdouts, the Italian bondholders
were sidelined and unpaid until the Macri government normalized
Argentina's financial situation in 2016.178 Ultimately, the greatest
spoils in Argentina's debt disputes went to the most uncompromising,
sophisticated, and litigious creditors.1 79 The benefits of ISDS for
creditor rights are likely to be similarly concentrated.
Second, ISDS may needlessly hamper the restructuring and
recovery process by increasing creditor fragmentation and
undermining the flexibility for sovereigns attempting to negotiate
settlements in good faith.1 80 Tribunalization exacerbates creditor
fragmentation, which already creates serious problems for sovereign
debt restructuring.181 Claimants need specific treaty-based rights to
bring sovereign debt claims in ISDS. But treaties giving rise to these
rights are far from comprehensive; they are jurisdiction-specific (i.e.,
the Italy-Argentina BIT only addressed claims by Italian nationals)
and vary in material ways (e.g., the scope of covered investments).1 82
Claims by Italian bondholders against Argentina were heard in three
separate ICSID arbitration proceedings and did not address claims by
175. See Gregory R. Day, Private Solutions to Global Crises, 89 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 1097, 1105-06 (2015) (noting the advantages of ICSID for enforcement of
judgments against multinational corporations).
176. See, e.g., Come and Get Me, supra note 78 (discussing setbacks and
limitations in the enforcement of ICSID awards).
177. For instance, a small group of non-ISDS holdout creditors-mostly from
Germany and acting through funds based in Luxembourg and the British Virgin
Islands-settled with Argentina in May 2017 on the same terms as the famous
February 2016 settlement agreements. See Daniel Bases, Argentina Settles with More
Holdout Creditors - Mediator, REUTERS (May 31, 2017, 1:13 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/argentina-debt-idUSL1N1IIX19T
[https://perma.cc/EJ5C-7UXK] (archived Aug. 28, 2017).
178. See supra notes 132-133 and accompanying text (detailing the timeline for
settlement with the Italian bondholders).
179. The most successful creditors also happened to be sophisticated and well-
funded professional plaintiffs. See Samples & Cruces, supra note 72, at 37
(underscoring disparities among returns for creditors in the NML settlement); see also
Gelpern, Now What?, supra note 27 at 73 (observing that "debt settlements favor the
most aggressive litigants").
180. See Dania Thomas, Sovereign Debt as a Commodity: A Contract Law
Perspective, 54 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 419 (2017) (criticizing overly narrow and rigid
judicial approaches to resolving sovereign debt disputes).
181. See William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the
Best Interest of Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1, 20-22 (2004) (explaining the problematic
consequences of increasing fragmentation among sovereign creditors).
182. See supra notes 110-116 (discussing distinctions in the scope of covered
investments among various BITs emerging from ICSID cases and recent developments
in Argentina's BIT practices).
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bondholders in other jurisdictions.18 3 Further, the ICSID disputes ran
parallel to litigation in national courts and were settled separately.184
Finally, faith in ISDS fails to acknowledge its political
ramifications.8 5 This is evident in sovereign debt restructurings,
which are often politically fragile compromises among various
domestic constituencies. Backlash against external creditors can be
toxic for debtor-creditor relations, thereby limiting opportunities for
coordination and productive negotiations.18 6 Argentina's crisis, for
instance, generated deep resentment of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and foreign creditors for their roles in exacerbating the
country's economic woes.18 7 Amid the perceived illegitimacy of
external debt, Argentina's political system was galvanized against
creditors from the beginning, providing overwhelming domestic
support for the Argentine government's aggressiveness in its dealings
with international institutions and foreign creditors.'8 8 In these
politically sensitive situations, ISDS may undermine the flexibility
necessary for sovereigns to mediate the competing demands of foreign
creditors and the welfare of its own citizens.18 9 For example, a
sovereign may need to prioritize debt held by domestic creditors over
foreign creditors in order to preserve the stability of its domestic
financial system.19 0 However, this may violate national treatment
183. See supra Part III.B (discussing the various claims at ICSID by Italian
bondholders against Argentina).
184. See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text.
185. See Teitel & Howse, supra note 9, at 980 (observing that tribunalization of
international investment law has politicized the impact of globalization); see also Jacob
Katz Cogan, The Regulatory Turn in International Law, 52 HARV. INT'L L. J. 321, 364
(2011) (noting how global governance through regulation prioritizes adjudication over
political decision making).
186. Greece's debt crisis vividly illustrates the potential for domestic politics to
turn against external creditors. See, e.g., Jale Tosun, Anna Wetzel & Galina
Zapryanova, The EU in Crisis: Advancing the Debate, 36 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 195, 196
(2014) (discussing political pressures and social unrest associated with fiscal transfers
and austerity measures in Greece).
187. See Todd Benson, Report Looks Harshly at I.M.F.'s Role in Argentine Debt
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/30/business/report-
looks-harshly-at-imf-s-role-in-argentine-debt-crisis.html ( ast visited Aug. 28, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/N8W5-C78G] (archived Aug. 28, 2017) (describing a self-critical IMF
report on its role in Argentina's debt crisis).
188. Argentine Leader's Nationalism Popular, Risky, CNN (Jan. 9, 2004),
http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/americas/01/09/argentina.kirchner.reut/ (last
visited Aug. 28, 2017) [https://perma.cc/LX7W-7FZP] (archived Aug. 28, 2017) ("A
December poll gave Kirchner an 80 percent approval rating. The main reason was his
IMF stance. . . ").
189. See Daniel D. Bradlow, Can Parallel Lines Ever Meet? The Strange Case of
the International Standards on Sovereign Debt and Business and Human Rights, 41
YALE J. INT'L L. ONLINE 201, 229-30 (2016) (noting the challenge that sovereigns face
in balancing the short-term social costs of a restructuring with its long-term benefits).
190. See Anna Gelpern & Brad Setser, Domestic and External Debt: The Doomed
Quest for Equal Treatment, 35 GEO. J. INT'L L. 795 (2004) (arguing that sovereigns
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under a BIT.19 1 Arbitral tribunals are ill-equipped to properly analyze
the public policy implications of such situations.192 Without granting
deference to sovereigns (in recognizing either opt-outs in bond
contracts negotiated ex ante or good faith exceptions to BIT
obligations asserted ex post), ISDS will hamper the ability of
governments to balance creditor demands and regulatory
objectives.1 93
V. CONCLUSION
Argentina's debt default, restructuring, and disputes with
holdout creditors were all historic. The legal innovations and norm-
bending dimensions of Argentina's debt saga have provoked a variety
of reflections, including both institutional responses and contractual
reforms. As this Article has shown, tribunalization is yet another
legacy that has already spurred responses by sovereigns and
investors. From Abaclat to Gramercy, a new frontier in the already
fragmented global sovereign debt market has been opened,
presenting new challenges to sovereign autonomy in the global
financial system.
should be able to treat domestic and foreign creditors differently to respond to a
financial crisis).
191. Gallagher, supra note 54, at 372.
192. See Vera Korzun, The Right to Regulate in Investor-State Arbitration:
Slicing and Dicing Regulatory Carve-Outs, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 355, 360 (2017)
(describing how ISDS rules may interfere with state regulation); see also Van Harten &
Loughlin, supra note 101, at 146 (discussing the power of ISDS to limit and alter a
sovereign's domestic public authority).
193. See Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT'L L. J. 229, 287
(2015) (proposing greater scrutiny of FET clauses and other treaty-based investor
protections).
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